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Abstract
For a general class of oligopoly models with price competition, we analyze the im-
pact of ex-ante leniency programs in antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-
sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics including
its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles the e¤ects of traditional antitrust regula-
tion and the leniency program. Ex-ante leniency programs are e¤ective if and only if
these o¤er substantial rewards to the self-reporting rm. This is in contrast to currently
employed programs that are therefore ine¤ective.
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1 Introduction
During the last two decades, antitrust policies in the US and the EC have undergone substan-
tial reforms and currently include leniency programs as a key ingredient, e.g. US Department
of Justice (1993) and EC (2002). Leniency programs grant total or partial immunity from
nes to rms collaborating with the antitrust authority (AA) by revealing crucial information
about the existence of the cartel that is needed for a successful conviction by penal courts.
Information may be revealed ex-ante before an investigation conducted by the AA starts, or
ex-post during an ongoing investigation. Leniency programs are based upon the economic
principle that rms, who broke the antitrust law, might report their illegal activities if given
proper incentives to do so and, if e¤ective, might dissolve existing cartels or, even better, a
priori deter such illegal activities. In the US, antitrust policy species (reduced) nes that
are related to the cartels net gain, and caught cartel members face additional liabilities in
the form of private law suites by harmed customers. The EC legislation has penalty schemes
for conviction and leniency that are proportional to the cartels gain. Even though it is
legally possible within many EU countries, private lawsuits are almost absent.
Despite a large literature on the theory of enforcement against individual illegal behav-
ior, see e.g. Polinsky and Shavell (2000), the theory of antitrust policy is still in its infancy
when it comes to enforcing market competition with little attention to its implementation,
see e.g. Rey (2003) and Spagnolo (2007). Illegal anti-competitive behavior is a much more
complicated subject since it typically is a concerted illegal action performed within an on-
going relationship over time, called a cartel. The theory of antitrust policy must therefore
be conducted in a dynamic setting. The early literature deals with cartel stability in the
absence of policy intervention, often modelled as a repeated game as in e.g. Abreu et al.
(1986) and Green and Porter (1984). Recently, optimal implementation of antitrust policy
for cartel enforcement has been analyzed in e.g. Motta and Polo (2003), Spagnolo (2004,
2007), Harrington (2004, 2005), Hinloopen (2003, 2006), Motchenkova (2004), Buccirossi
and Spagnolo (2006) and Harrington and Chen (2006).
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The seminal paper on optimal revelation schemes as part of antitrust policy is Motta
and Polo (2003), who study, loosely speaking, a Stackelberg game in which the AA rst
chooses once and for all its antitrust policy followed by the competition phase in which
the rms compete among each other, which is modelled as an innitely-repeated oligopoly
game. Market competition is restricted to a discrete set of three prices that captures the
three most important prot levels: The prot under perfect competition, under the cartel
and the prot of optimally cheating on the cartel price. In each period, rms decide whether
to reveal information about their misconduct. The cartel adopts grim-trigger strategies in
which cheating on the cartel by either setting a di¤erent price or applying for leniency triggers
competitive behavior forever, while the cartel continues its illegal business as usual each time
it is caught by the AA. Under the optimal antitrust policy, introduction of ex-post leniency
programs will increase the chance of the cartel being captured, but ex-ante leniency programs
that grant reduced nes are ine¤ective. As later shown in Spagnolo (2004) and Rey (2003),
e¤ective ex-ante leniency programs require substantial rewards, i.e., pay self-reporting rms.
Harrington and Chen (2006) incorporate ex-ante leniency programs into a special case
of the framework in Harrington (2004 and 2005) to augment traditional antitrust policy in
an environment where cartels arouse suspicions. In such environment, cartels also need to
manage suspicions, modeled as if the cartel keeps in mind an endogenous detection proba-
bility. This probability is modelled as a function of the cartels price setting, where price is
a continuous variable. The focus is on an exogenous antitrust policy in order to study the
cartels optimal reaction on the prot-maximizing cartel price, which means that the price
setting by the cartel has become an endogenous decision. This model can be regarded as
the competition phase in Motta and Polo (2003) in a very general setting. The cartel adopts
grim-trigger strategies that are similar to those in Motta and Polo (2003), but with the dif-
ference that the cartel terminates its illegal business after being caught once by the AA. So,
the cartel culture of whether to continue the cartel after being caught di¤ers between Motta
and Polo (2003) and Harrington and Chen (2006). In the last reference, the detection prob-
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ability also depends upon past prices and collusive behavior induces a cumulative liability in
the form of xed nes and private law suites. These two features introduce state variables
into the model and this makes the equilibrium nontractable. The analysis, therefore, has to
resort to simulations of price paths. Nevertheless, the model admits a steady-state prot-
maximizing cartel price that lies above the competitive price, and this price is independent
of the leniency program meaning such program is ine¤ective.
The foci of our paper are also detection probabilities and penalty schemes that are sensi-
tive to the cartels pricing behavior within a generalized repeated-game version of Harrington
and Chen (2006). Our model generalizes Motta and Polo (2003) by including endogenous
cartel behavior, the presence of suspicions, the notion of cartel culture1, and a general class
of exogenous antitrust policies with proportional penalty schemes that include the possibil-
ity of an e¤ective reward. Several aspects of the model in Harrington and Chen (2006) are
also generalized, namely a general oligopoly model instead of Bertrand oligopoly, general
penalty schemes with ne reductions that include rewards, and the introduction of cartel
culture. In fact, our notion of cartel culture unies the opposite assumptions in Motta and
Polo (2003) and Harrington and Chen (2006) with respect to this parameter. Therefore, our
model bridges the rudimentary market competition phase in Motta and Polo (2003) with
the general approach in Harrington and Chen (2006).
An innovative but unconventional aspect of our model is that we analyze the maximal
cartel price, i.e., the largest cartel price for which the equilibrium conditions for sustainability
hold, instead of the standard approach of prot maximization by the cartel. There are
several reasons why the maximal cartel price is interesting: First, experimental economics
has established that often economic agents behave di¤erently from standard microeconomic
theory. This hints at that cartel members may also behave di¤erent from prot maximization.
Indeed, there is empirical evidence in support of Baumols hypothesis that managers of large
1Cartel culture is related to the probability that the cartel resumes business as usual after each conviction
by the antitrust authorities. Bosch and Eckard (1991) report that 14 per cent of 1300 rms are recidivist.
This implies, on average, a cartel culture of :86 in our model.
3
corporations seek to maximize sales rather than prots, see e.g. Baumol (1958) and McGuire
et al. (1962). As an alternative, the sustainability of cartel behavior o¤ers a more robust
criterion that does not depend on the cartels objective. Furthermore, the characterization of
societys maximal damage through the maximal cartel price can be regarded as a worst-case
scenario for societys unawareness about the cartels objective. Second, under traditional
antitrust regulation, we report that the cartels value function may fail to be monotonically
increasing and concave in the cartel price for all parameter values. This poses a technical
problem in characterizing the prot-maximizing cartel price. We show that the maximal
cartel price does not have this drawback. Third, there is a large subclass of parameter values
for which the equilibrium conditions are binding under both the prot-maximizing cartel
price and the maximal cartel price and, hence, both cartel prices coincide. This includes the
subclass of parameter values for which the value function is monotonic.
Our analysis shows that a direct approach to characterize the maximal cartel price based
upon inverting the (possibly non-monotonic) value function is not applicable. To overcome
this technical issue, our characterization is based upon analyzing properties of the threshold
level for the discount factor as a function of price and, then, translate these properties into the
maximal cartel price as a function of the discount factor. This novel approach turns out to be
very fruitful to characterize the maximal cartel price. This price is increasing in the discount
factor, and it decreases in the cartel culture parameter and in the parameters characterizing
penalty schemes (the coe¢ cients of proportional nes and detection probabilities).
For a general class of ex-ante leniency programs, we show that such programs cannot be
e¤ective without rewards. We also characterize the minimal e¤ective reward that is needed
to make ex-ante leniency programs e¤ective and break the cartel. The minimal e¤ective
reward critically depends upon the traditional antitrust policy employed. With respect to
analyzing leniency programs, we also make a technical but useful remark in checking and
deriving equilibrium strategies, application of the one-stage-deviation principle implies that
one does not need to investigate simultaneously a deviation in the price setting stage and
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the revelation stage.
Our characterization of the maximal cartel price under traditional antitrust policy com-
plements the results in Harrington (2004 and 2005). In the latter references, it is shown that
the prot-maximizing cartel price has non-binding equilibrium conditions for su¢ ciently
large discount factors and that it is strictly decreasing in the discount factor. Combined
with our results, monotonicity of the prot-maximizing cartel price fails for the entire range
of discount factors, which we illustrate by means of a robust example. In this example, the
prot-maximizing cartel price also underestimates by far the maximal damage to society
whenever the equilibrium conditions are non-binding. Finally, our results also hint at that
the ine¤ectiveness of ex-ante leniency programs without rewards, as reported in Harrington
and Chen (2006) for very large discount factors, generalizes to all discount factors.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the benchmark model where we
derive maximal cartel price in the absence of any regulation. In section 3 we analyze the
impact of traditional tools of antitrust enforcement on maximal sustainable cartel price and
relate it to the characteristics of the industry. In section 4 we compare the e¤ectiveness
of antitrust enforcement supplemented by leniency programs to the results of the previous
section. Section 5 concludes the analysis and discusses the policy recommendations.
2 The Benchmark Model
Consider an oligopoly market where n  2 rms compete over innitely many periods.
Assume that all rms have a common discount factor  2 (0; 1) per period. During each
period, rms compete in a symmetric Bertrand model with either homogenous or heteroge-
neous products. Let (p) be an individual rms prot function in any period with price
prole p 2 Rn+. Since we often deal with symmetric outcomes, we simplify (p; : : : ; p)  (p).
Denote the static Nash equilibrium price and the maximal collusive price by pN and pM , re-
spectively. To simplify the exposition, we normalize the static model so that (pN) = 0.
In every period, the rms decide whether to collude and if so, to what degree. In other
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words, all rms choose a price p = pN + I
 
pM   pN, where I 2 [0; 1] can be considered as
a collusion index. One key element in analyzing cartel stability is a rms prot from uni-
lateral deviation against the cartel when all the other rms set their prices at p, denoted as
opt (p) = supp0  (p
0; p; : : : ; p). We deliberately write supremum instead of the maximum in
order to also have a well-dened value function for the discontinuous case of homogeneous
products. In order to capture the relevant oligopoly models in the literature, we assume
that (p) is continuous and strictly increasing for p 2 [pN ; pM ], opt (p) is continuous and
opt (p) > (p) > 0 for p 2  pN ; pM. 2
A novelty is that we dene  (p) as the relative size of the cartel prot to the prot under
best unilateral deviation. More specically,
(p) =
(
(p)
opt(p)
; for p 2 (pN ; pM ];
1; for p = pN :
Our assumptions on (p) imply that (p) < (pN)  1 for all p 2 (pN ; pM ]. Since the
function () might be discontinuous at p = pN , as Example 2 illustrates, we introduce3
 = lim
"!0+
(pN + ")  1 and  = (pM):
To our analysis, two sectors with the same  () function will be treated as identical. Note
that  () is the ratio of individual rms prot from the cartel to the prot from unilateral
optimal deviation against the cartel. This means that higher  (), the less incentives each
cartel member has to deviate, and the more stable the cartel is. Consequently,  () represents
the degree of incentives to deviate or degree of cartel stability in the sector. We assume that
(p) is non-increasing for all p 2 (pN ; pM ], so that the higher the cartel price, the higher the
incentive of each cartel member to deviate.4
We will analyze antitrust regulation and leniency programs in Sections 3 and 4, respec-
tively. The underlying model with or without antitrust regulation is a standard innitely-
2Note that this setup is identical to Harrington (2004 and 2005).
3The limit  is well dened, because the correspondence ^() that solves ^ (p)opt (p) =  (p) for each
p 2 [pN ; pM ] is upper semi-continuous for all p 2 [pN ; pM ] and it coincides with the continuous function  ()
for all p > pN .
4This is a mild assumption that captures the class of symmetric heterogeneous Bertrand duopolies with
linear demand functions and common constant marginal costs.
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repeated game with the static model described above as the stage game. Under a leniency
program, however, the model becomes an innitely-repeated sequential game since rms may
self-report to the AA. Throughout this paper, we focus on a class of modied grim-trigger
strategies to sustain cartel price p > pN in which any deviation leads to the repetition of
the perfectly competitive equilibrium outcome in every period thereafter. The underlying
rationale is that cartels are based upon trust and, by the reciprocal nature of humans, all
trust is gone after someone cheats.
In this paper, the equilibrium concept is subgame perfect equilibrium. In verifying equi-
librium conditions, we apply the one-stage-deviation principle, see e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991). This principle states that it is su¢ cient to consider only so-called one-stage devia-
tions5 instead of verifying all possible deviating strategies. Especially for the model with a
leniency program, we only need to consider unilateral deviations at either the price setting
stage or the self-reporting stage but not both stages simultaneously. To verify equilibrium
conditions, only the expected prots from unilateral one-stage deviations are required.
In the remainder of this section, we analyze the benchmark in the absence of any antitrust
regulation and leniency program under the standard grim-trigger strategy prole to sustain a
cartel price of p > pN . In the absence of any antitrust regulation, the necessary and su¢ cient
condition to support p 2  pN ; pM as a cartel price is
opt (p) +

1  
 
pN
  1
1  (p)()   1  (p): (1)
Since  (p) is non-increasing in p, (1) implies that the threshold for  is non-decreasing in
the cartel price p 2  pN ; pM, and it is equivalent to p  maxp : p 2  1(1  )	. Because
pN satises (1) for all  2 (0; 1), we have pN  maxp : p 2  1(1  )	. The socially worst
outcome is the maximal cartel price supported by the grim-trigger strategy proles;6
pC = max
p2[pN ;pM ]
p; s.t. (1). (2)
5A one-stage deviation is a strategy that almost coincides with the strategy under consideration, except
at one particular stage and history where it prescribes a di¤erent action.
6The idea of an endogenous cartel price is also studied in Harrington (2004).
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The maximal cartel price pC is well dened since (1) induces a closed subinterval (possibly
degenerated) of [pN ; pM ].
Due the monotonicity of (p), the prot of each cartel member is also maximized at
the maximal cartel price pC among all subgame perfect equilibria supported by grim-trigger
strategy proles. However, as we will see later, this may not be the case under an antitrust
regulation with or without a leniency program.
Now we explain how we characterize the maximal cartel price pC later on. A direct
approach would be to solve (1) for p as a function of all parameters, which requires the
inverse function  1(1  ). In Section 3 and 4, however, the function of p that needs to be
inverted becomes very complicated and may even lack monotonicity properties. Instead, our
characterization is based upon analyzing properties of the threshold level for  as a function
of p 2 [pN ; pM ] and then, translate these properties to the maximal cartel price as a function
of  in the (; p)-plane. This indirect approach turns out to be very fruitful, as the following
result for the benchmark demonstrates.
Proposition 1 In the absence of any antitrust regulation, the maximal cartel price pC is
non-decreasing in  2 (0; 1), and
pC = pN ; for  2 (0; 1  );
pC 2 [pN ; pM); for  2 [1  ; 1  );
pC = pM ; for  2 [1  ; 1):
Proof. For 0 > ,   1   (p) implies that 0  1   (p). This means that any
p 2 [pN ; pM ] that satises (2) for  must also satisfy (2) for 0. Hence, pC must be non-
decreasing in  2 (0; 1). If  < 1   , then (2) will be violated for all p > pN , and hence
pC = pN . Finally, (2) holds for p = pM if and only if   1  , and hence pC = pM .
We will treat the maximal cartel price pC in the absence of any antitrust regulation as
the benchmark when evaluating the e¤ectiveness of an antitrust regulation in Section 3 and
a leniency program in Section 4. Unlike some of the early work, we do not restrict our
analysis to the issue whether the monopoly price can be supported by the cartel. Although
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an antitrust regulation may not be e¤ective in preventing the cartel from the monopoly price,
we are interested in its relative e¤ectiveness comparing with the case without any antitrust
regulation.
In economic applications, one can resort to a simple numerical implementation of our
approach: Numerically calculate  (p) = 1   (p) and, then, by reversing the dependence,
plot the numerical values in the (; p)-space for  2 [1   ; 1   ). In some cases, such as
Example 2 and 3, closed-form solutions for the inverse function  1(1  ) can be derived.
Example 2 Consider a homogeneous Bertrand oligopoly model with linear demand y = 2 p
and 0 marginal costs. Note that pN = 0 and pM = 1. For all p 2 (pN ; pM ], each of the n rms
may deviate by slightly undercutting the others to obtain the full cartel prot, i.e., (p) = 1
n
for all p 2 (pN ; pM ]. Consequently,  =  = 1
n
. Proposition 1 then implies that
pC =

pN ; for  < 1  1
n
;
pM ; for   1  1
n
:
Example 3 Consider a (symmetric) heterogenous Bertrand duopoly model. For i 6= j, the
demand function faced by rm i is given by yi = 1   api + bpj, where a > b > 0. Firm is
prot function is
i(pi; pj) = (1  api + bpj) pi   F;
where F = a
(2a b)2 is the xed cost that normalizes the model so that 
 
pN

= 0 at the static
Nash equilibrium price pN = 1
2a b . To nd the maximal collusive price,
max
p
(1  ap+ bp) p) pM = 1
2 (a  b) > p
N :
For p 2 [pN ; pM ], we have (p) = (1  (a  b)p)p  F and opt(p) = (1+bp)2
4a
  F . Recall that
 (p) = (p)
opt(p)
, we have
d (p)
dp
=
N (p)
opt(p)2
where N (p) = d(p)
dp
opt(p)  (p)d
opt(p)
dp
:
Observe that
dN (p)
dp
=
d2(p)
dp2
opt(p)  (p)d
2opt(p)
dp2
= ( 2a+ 2b)opt(p)  2b
2
4a
(p) < 0;
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which implies that N (p) is strictly decreasing in p 2 [pN ; pM ]. Since N (pN) = 0 from
(pN) = opt(pN) = 0, we have N (p) < 0 for all p 2 (pN ; pM ] and N (pN) = 0. Therefore,
 (p) is strictly decreasing in p 2 (pN ; pM ]. By LHôpitals rule, it is easy to check that  = 1,
which means that  (p) is continuous for all p 2 [pN ; pM ]. Proposition 1 then implies that if
  1  , we have pC = pM , and if  < 1  , pC is the solution to  (p) = 1  , i.e.
   4a (a  b) + b2 (1  ) p2 + (4a  2b (1  )) p  (4aF + 1  ) = 0:
Since  = 1 and  (p) is strictly decreasing in p, we have that pC > pN for all  > 0 and pC
is strictly increasing in  2 (0; 1  ). More specically, we have
pC =
(
2a b(1 )+2
p
a(a(1 4F (a b)) Fb2(1 ))
4a(a b)+b2(1 ) ; for  2 (0; 1  );
pM = 1
2(a b) ; for  2 [1  ; 1);
where  =
4 (a  b) a  16 (a  b)2 aF
(2a  b)2   16 (a  b)2 aF :
The following gure illustrates pC as a function of  2 (0; 1) for a = 2 and b = 1.
-
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1
pC
pN = 13
pM = 12
1   = 917
3 Antitrust Enforcement
In this section, we examine the impact of traditional antitrust policy. The AA investigates
the market outcome in every period with certain probability and implements an antitrust
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policy. Upon being caught, violators will be ned. Given p 2 [pN ; pM ], the AA will nd the
rms guilty of collusion with probability (p) 2 [0; 1). We assume that (pN) = 0, and (p)
is a non-decreasing di¤erentiable function. As in Rey (2003), hard evidence disappears after
one period meaning that if the rms are found guilty of sustaining cartel price p 2 (pN ; pM ],
every rmwill have to pay a one-time ne k(p)(p), where k(p) is a non-decreasing continuous
function of p, such that k
 
pN

= 0 and k(p) > 0 for all p 2 (pN ; pM ].7 The function  ()
reects that a higher cartel price might invoke more attention from the AA about cartel
abuse and make detection more likely. Any cartel will take the negative e¤ects of its cartel
price into account when deciding upon the price.8 9
We model the AA as a passive player in this model, while rms are the active players.
The detection probability () is limited by the resources of the authority, and the ne
schedule k() is limited by legislation.10 Empirical evidence from the OECD countries on
antitrust policies, see OECD (2002), reports detection probabilities in the range of one out
of seven or six and levels of nes in the range of two to three times the illegal gains from
cartel.11 This can be formalized as 1
7
  (p)  1
6
and 2  k (p)  3. These facts imply
7Technically speaking, we exclude xed nes F > 0, because k(p)(p) + F for all p 2 (pN ; pM ] would
imply a discontinuity at p = pN . However, for every F > 0, there exists a continuous approximation that
can be made arbitrarily to the discontinuous function and that also satises our assumptions. Formally, for
every F > 0 and " > 0, there exists a continuous approximation k" (p) such that k" (p) (p) = k (p) (p)+F
for all p 2 (pN + "; pM ] and k"
 
pN


 
pN

= 0.
8The competition stage in Motta and Polo (2003) results if we assume constant functions  (p) =  2 [0; 1],
k (p) (p) = k > 0 for all p 2 [pN ; pM ] and restrict the set of feasible prices p 2 pN ; pM  to the discrete set
pN , pM and the optimal deviation against pM .
9The repeated-game version of the model in Harrington (2004) can be obtained as follows: the potential
liability Xt at period t is equal to, in our terminology, 0 Xt 1 + 1  [k (p) (p) + F ], where F > 0 is a xed
ne and k (p) (p) represents each rms liability of private lawsuits. Our detection probability only depends
upon the current price and is independent upon the previous one.
10According to the sentencing guidelines in most European countries, nes are bounded by either a xed
monetary amount or approximately 10% of overall annual turnover of the rm. In the US, however, there is
no legal upper bound.
11The quote from OECD (2002) says: "It is widely agreed that an e¤ective sanction against a cartel should
take into account not only the amount of gain realized by the cartel but also the probability that any given
cartel will be detected and prosecuted. Because not all cartels are detected, the nancial sanction against
one that is detected should exceed the gain actually realized by the cartel. Some experts believe that as few
as one in six or seven cartels are detected and prosecuted, implying a multiple of at least six. A multiple of
three is more commonly cited, however." In the Annex B of OECD (2002), a range of nes between two and
three times the illegal prots is reported. The report also mentions countries with a xed ne independent
of the illegal gains. Both systems are used in OECD countries at the moment.
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an expected penalty roughly between 30% to 50% of illegal gains or monopoly prots, or
2
7
  (p) k (p)  1
2
. Therefore, the AA may not be able to deter these violations. In this
paper, we simply assume that 0   (p) k (p) < 1 for all p 2  pN ; pM. This less restrictive
assumption implies that the expected ne at any price above the competitive price is lower
than the (per period) cartel prot and, therefore, any cartel is tempted to set its price above
the competitive price.
An important aspect in assessing the e¤ectiveness of the antitrust regulation is how the
cartel members react to detection. In some cases, being caught once is su¢ cient to deter
the cartel members from continuing any such illegal activity in the future. In other cases,
the economic sector is notorious for its persistent cartel activities despite many convictions.
Persistence means members pay the nes and continue (illegal) business as usual. Since
antitrust regulation is involved with all sectors in the economy, the cartel culture within
each sector plays an important role in evaluating the e¤ectiveness of the antitrust policy. To
allow for a wide range of cartel behavior or to accommodate these di¤erences across sectors,
we introduce a cartel culture parameter. Let  2 [0; 1] be the probability that the rms
will behave competitively after each time the cartel is detected. To put it di¤erently, the
cartel culture parameter is interpreted as the probability that the cartel stops its activities
after each detection. A high degree of persistence with renewed cartel activity for almost
sure is associated with a value of  close to 0. Similar, a value of  = 1 means the sector
would become competitive after the cartel being detected.12 Motta and Polo (2003) assume
detection does not dissolve the cartel, i.e., the cartel culture  = 0, and Harrington (2004)
assumes detection dissolves the cartel, i.e., the cartel culture  = 1. Our cartel-culture
parameter captures both models.
Let V (p) be the present value of a cartel members expected prot if the cartel sets price
p 2 pN ; pM in every period. This present value for each cartel member consists of the
12The parameter  can be estimated from time series for a particular industry that specify the date of
inspection by the authorities and the outcome in terms of whether the rms were found guilty. The fraction
of times a convicted cartel was found guilty again at the next investigation serves as a proxy for .
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current illegal gains  (p) from the cartel, the expected ne  (p) k (p)(p), the expected
continuation prot of a renewed cartel after detection  (p) (1  )V (p), and the expected
continuation prot of not being detected (1   (p)) V (p);
V (p) =  (p) +  (p) [ k(p)(p) + (1  )V (p)] + [1   (p)] V (p)
=  (p)   (p) k (p)(p) +  [1   (p)]V (p) :
Solving for V (p) yields that
V (p) =
1   (p) k (p)
1   [1   (p)] (p) : (3)
Note that V
 
pN

=
(pN)
1  = 0 due to 
 
pN

= 0. For all p 2 (pN ; pM ], V (p) > 0 as
 (p) k (p) < 1. Since  (p) > 0 and k (p) > 0 for all p 2 (pN ; pM ], we have V (p) < (p)
1  .
This reects that the possibility of being detected and ned reduces the expected cartel
gains. This implies that an antitrust regulation reduces the expected gains from any cartel
compared to the benchmark case. Although  (p) is assumed to be monotonically increasing
in p, V (p) may not be monotonic in p since the fraction in (3) is non-increasing and  (p)
is non-decreasing in p 2 (pN ; pM ]. To simplify verication of the rst statement, denote
B = 1   (p)and A =  (p) k (p). Then,
@
@p
1   (p) k (p)
1   [1   (p)] =
@
@p
1 B
1   (1  A) =
B0 [1   (1  A)]  A0B
[1   (1  A)]2  0
due to A < 1, A0  0 and B0  0 for all p 2 (pN ; pM ]. The above inequality is strict if
0 (p) > 0. This property and the product form of V (p) also destroy concavity, as Example
8 below illustrates. So, maximization of V (p) would also require investigation of second-order
conditions.
The cartel would become unprotable, independent of its cartel culture  2 [0; 1], if the
AA could set its policy  (p) k (p) > 1, i.e., the expected ne is above 100% of illegal gains. As
we have discussed, the current practice within the OECD countries indicates that  (p) k (p)
is at most 50%. Inspection of (3) also shows that cartel prot is decreasing with respect to
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its culture parameter  (higher  means less persistence). How this a¤ects antitrust policy
will be dealt with later.
Moreover, the cartel has its own destabilizing forces working from within. These destabi-
lizing forces are the incentives of individual cartel members to cheat on the cartels implicit
agreement. In order to express these incentives, it is necessary that we describe what hap-
pens within the cartel after some of its members cheat. As motivated in Section 2, cartel
members adopt the following modied grim-trigger strategy prole to sustain a cartel price
of p > pN :
1. Firms continue to set a price p > 0 with probability 1   every time the AA detects
their fraud (and with probability  behave competitively ever after).
2. Any deviation by some cartel members leads to the perfectly competitive equilibrium
pN in every period ever after.
This modied grim-trigger strategy prole assumes that the trust is gone forever when some
members cheat.
Given such an implicit cartel agreement, the prot from a unilateral deviation is equal to
the short term gain of opt (p) in the current period, followed the normalized prot from the
competitive equilibrium forever.13 In terms of Abreu et al. (1986), individual deviations are
punished by the symmetric stationary SPE pN . Consequently, the necessary and su¢ cient
condition to support a cartel price p 2  pN ; pM is V (p)  opt (p):
1   (p) k (p)
1   [1   (p)] (p)  
opt (p) ; (4)
which implies that
(p)  (p)  1   [1   (p)]
1   (p) k (p) ; (5)
13We assume that after a rm deviates, this rm will not be found guilty due to its heterogeneous price
set, while the other rms may still be found guilty and ned by the anti-trust authority.
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where  (p) is a continuous function on [pN ; pM ]. Obviously, p = pN satises inequality (5)
and it would reduce to (1) if  (p) = 0 for all p 2 (pN ; pM ]. So, we can conclude that (5)
generalizes the benchmark model of absence of any regulation discussed in section 2.
Before continuing the economic analysis, we rst establish the following properties of the
function  () as dened in (5).
Lemma 4 (p) is non-decreasing in p and increasing when either 0(p) > 0 or k0(p) > 0.
Moreover, (p) is increasing in , k (p) and  (p) and decreasing in .
Proof. Taking derivative of (p) with respect to p, we have
d(p)
dp
=
0 (p) [1   (p) k(p)] + [0 (p) k(p) +  (p) k0(p)] [1   (1   (p))]
[1   (p) k(p)]2  0;
due to our assumptions on  (p) and k(p). In addition, when either 0(p) > 0 or k0(p) > 0,
the above inequality is strict. Next, ^ (p) >  (p) implies
[(1  ) k (p) + ][^ (p)   (p)] > 0() 1  [1  ^ (p)]
1  ^ (p) k (p) >
1   [1   (p)]
1   (p) k (p) :
The e¤ects of ,  and k (p) are obvious.
Lemma 4 implies that the right-hand side of (5) increases when  increases. Hence, a
lower  would weaken (5). This implies that the more persistent the collusion is (i.e., lower
), the easier it is to sustain a cartel price. Similar, the right-hand side of (5) is decreasing
in , meaning that an increase in  would relax (5). As the rms care more about future,
it becomes easier to sustain the same cartel price. Also an overall increase in detection
probabilities  (p) or nes k (p) would make collusion harder to sustain.
The variable of interest is the maximal cartel price. Higher cartel prices put an upward
pressure on the right-hand side of (5). This reduces the sustainability of p and only indus-
tries with relative high values of  (p) close to 1 might withstand this pressure, meaning
the short-term gains of blowing up the cartel must be relatively close to the cartel prot
 (p). Since the weak monotonicity properties of  (p) (non-decreasing) and  (p) (non-
increasing) are opposite, the intersection (p) = (p) is either a unique price or a closed
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subinterval of [pN ; pM ]. Furthermore, if p 2 (pN ; pM ] is any such price, then all lower prices
can also be sustained by the cartel. So, the range of prices that can be sustained as cartel
prices in (5) is a closed subinterval of [pN ; pM ] and the maximal cartel price is bounded by
max fp : (p) = (p)g.
Note that 
 
pN

= 1   . It is straightforward that p = pN satises (5) since (pN) =
1 > 
 
pN

. Given the monotonicity of  (p) and  (p), we have a well-dened maximal
price on

pN ; pM

for all  2 [0; 1) and  2 [0; 1]. Under the antitrust policy discussed in this
section, the maximal cartel price is given by
pR = max
p2[pN ;pM ]
p; s.t. (5). (6)
where superscript R refers to the presence of antitrust regulation. Program (6) is a well-
dened program since p 2 [pN ; pM ] and (5) induces a closed subinterval of [pN ; pM ]. Because
V (p)may not be monotonic in p, the maximal cartel price pR may not maximize the expected
prot to each cartel member. Nevertheless, pR is the worst social outcome under such
antitrust regulation.
Comparing (2) and (6), our next result shows that antitrust regulation may lower the
maximal cartel price in general.
Proposition 5 For all parameter values, we have pN  pR  pC  pM :
Proof. By Lemma 4 and (pN) = 1   , we have (p)  1   . In other words, any p
that satises (5) must also satises (1), which concludes the proof.
To be more specic, similar to Proposition 1, we now derive the thresholds on the discount
factor  for di¤erent values of pR. Note that (5) can be rewritten as
  (p)  1  (p) [1   (p) k (p)]
[1   (p)] : (7)
Lemma 6 (p) is continuous and non-decreasing in p 2 (pN ; pM ], (p)  1   (p) (with
strict inequality when  (p) > 0) and increasing in k (p) and  (p).
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Proof. Since (p),  (p), and k (p) are all continuous in p 2 (pN ; pM ], so is (p). Taking
derivative of (p) with respect to p, we have
d(p)
dp
=
 0(p) [1   (p) k (p)] + (p) [0 (p) k (p) +  (p) k0 (p)]
[1   (p)] +(p)
0 (p)
1   (p)  0
due to 0(p)  0, 0 (p)  0 and k0 (p)  0. Note also that
(p)  1  (p) [1   (p) k (p)]
[1   (p)]  1  (p) [1   (p) k (p)]  1  (p):
The last inequality is strict when  (p) > 0. Next, ^ (p) >  (p) implies
[ (1   (p))+ (p)][^ (p)  (p)] > 0() 1  (p)[1  ^ (p) k (p)]
1  ^ (p) >
1  (p) [1   (p) k (p)]
1   (p)
The e¤ect of k (p) is obvious.
Proposition 7 Under antitrust regulation, the maximal cartel price pR is non-decreasing in
 2 (0; 1) and non-increasing in  2 [0; 1]. Furthermore, we have
pR = pN ; for  2 (0; 1  );
pR 2 [pN ; pM); for  2 [1  ;(pM));
pR = pM ; for  2 [(pM); 1);
An overall increase in detection  (p) or k (p) shifts (pM) and the entire curve to the right.
Proof. Lemma 4 and monotonicity of (p) imply that pR is non-decreasing in  and non-
increasing in . Note that (pN) = 0 and lim"!0+ (pN + ") = 1  . When  2 (0; 1  );
(5) fails for all p 2 (pN ; pM ] and, hence, pR = pN . For (pM)   < 1, (5) holds at p = pM
and, hence, pR = pM . Otherwise, we have pR 2 [pN ; pM).
Clearly, inequality (7) is more restrictive than (1) implying that introduction of antitrust
regulation with positive probability of being caught restricts the set of discount factors for
which collusion can be sustained for every possible price p 2 (pN ; pM ]. This implies that
cartel stability is reduced compared to benchmark case. Moreover, the fact that (p) is
non-decreasing in p implies that the antitrust policy discussed in this section might be more
e¤ective for more grave violations (i.e. collusion on higher prices).
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Proposition 7 also implies that
0 < 1    1    (pM) < 1:
Depending on the discount factor , Propositions 1, 7, and 5 imply the following results:
pN = pR = pC = pN ; if 0 <  < 1  ;
pN < pR < pC < pM ; if 1     < 1  ;
pN < pR < pC = pM ; if 1     < (pM);
pM = pR = pC = pM ; if (pM)   < 1:
When (pM)   < 1, the antitrust policy is not e¤ective to deter the cartel from setting
its monopoly price. In particular, antitrust enforcement would not be able to reduce the
cartel price below the monopoly level (pR = pM), when interval  2 [(pM); 1) is non-empty.
This implies that necessary and su¢ cient condition for pR = pM is (pM) < 1. By (7),
(pM) < 1 requires that condition (5) for cartel stability is broken at  = 1, i.e.,
(pM)

>

 
pM

1   (pM) k (pM) : (8)
This inequality can be numerically veried in applications, it is written to separate the
industry characteristics (;  (p)) from the policy instruments ( (p) ; k (p)).
Given a particular antitrust policy, it is interesting to investigate whether this policy can
eradicate the monopoly price for all cartel cultures. Solving condition (8) for  yields
 <

 
pM
 
1  k(pM)(pM)
(pM)
To destabilize cartels for all possible cartel cultures  2 [0; 1], the right-hand side must
be negative, i.e., (pM)k(pM) > 1. Hence, under any cartel policy that satises condition
0 < (p)k(p) < 1 for all p 2 (pN ; pM ], industries that are notorious for persistent cartel
behavior ( close to 0) cannot be eradicated by the antitrust policy unless one is willing to
adopt a policy that fully takes away the illegal gains (i.e. k(p)(p) > 1 for all p 2 (pN ; pM ]).
Another important conclusion is related to the impact of parameter  on sustainability of
the monopoly price. Recall, that  () can be viewed as a ratio of individual illegal gains from
cartel formation to prots from unilateral optimal deviation against the cartel. This implies
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that  () also relates to particular characteristics of a sector, such as incentives to deviate
or degree of cartel stability in the sector. Hence, conditions of the above proposition imply
that in sectors were the degree of cartel stability is higher (() closer to 1), the likelihood of
sustaining societys worst price pM also increases, since @=@ < 0. So that in these sectors,
we should expect that antitrust policy will be less e¤ective compared to the sectors with
lower ().
The main message of analysis in this section is a mixed blessing for antitrust regulation.
On the one hand, proposition 7 identies non-empty sets of parameter values for which
antitrust regulation is e¤ective in reducing the maximal price the cartel can sustain, i.e.,
pR < pC . On the other hand, as long as the authority or the legal system obeys condition
(8), there always will remain a large non-empty set of parameter values for which pR = pM ,
meaning the antitrust policy is totally ine¤ective on this set.
The following example illustrates the issues discussed in this section.
Example 8 Reconsider the homogeneous Bertrand oligopoly of Example 2. Suppose that
 (p) = p and k (p) = k, where k < 1. Then, (6) becomes
p (; ) = max
p2[0;1]
p; s.t.
1
n
 1   + p
1  kp :
Note that p = 0 is feasible in the quadratic constraint if and only if   1  1
n
. The constraint
can be rewritten as
p  1  n(1  )
(n + k)
;
which is the solution to the problem whenever it is between 0 and 1. The right hand side is
increasing in . To summarize, we have
pR =
(
0; if  < 1  1
n
;
min
n
1; 1 n(1 )
(n+k)
o
; if 1  1
n
  < 1:
Depending on the values of the parameters, pR may not be equal to pM = 1 for all  2
(0; 1), such as if (n + k) > 1. Since k < 1, this condition can hold only when n is
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su¢ ciently large. For sectors with a small number of rms and a cartel culture parameter
 that is su¢ ciently close to 0, the monopoly price will not be eradicated by the antitrust
regulation in this example. We can also see how each parameter value a¤ects the maximal
cartel price under the antitrust policy. Both possible cases for the curve of maximal prices pR
are illustrated by the following gure, where the vertical dotted line at  = 1   1
n
represents
the discontinuous jump in pN = 0 to pM = 1 under the benchmark case in Example 2.
-
6
112
n 1
n
1
pR
-
6
112
n 1
n
1
pR
We conclude this example, by relating our results to Harrington (2004 and 2005). By
(3), V (p) = 1 kp
1 (1 p)  (2 p)pn fails both monotonicity and concavity on

pN ; pM

.14 The
function is single peaked. For parameter values k = 3,  = 1
6
and  = 2
3
, neglecting the
equilibrium conditions as in Harrington (2005), MAPLE obtains from @V (p) =@p = 0 the
prot-maximizing cartel price
 27 (1  ) + 3
p
652   146 + 81
4
2 [0; 3
4
)
for all  2 [0; 1]. The prot-maximizing cartel price is decreasing on [0; 1]. Introducing the
equilibrium conditions, implies that the prot-maximizing cartel price is the minimum of the
above expression and pR (the gure to the left in the last two gures applies). These two price
curves intersect at   :955. So, on the interval [0; 0:955], the prot-maximizing cartel price
coincides with pR, while for the interval (:955; 1] the prot-maximizing cartel price is lower
14Without going into details, for  close to 1 it holds that @V (p) =@p > 0 for p close to 0, while @V (p) =@p <
0 for p close to 1. For parameter values k = 3,  = 16 ,  =
2
3 and  = :99, software package MAPLE returns
the inexion point p = 0:64433 2 pN ; pM  when solving @2V (p) =@p2 = 0.
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than pR because the equilibrium conditions are non-binding. This result conrms the assertion
in Harrington (2004 and 2005) that the equilibrium conditions are always non-binding for
su¢ ciently large  < 1. Our results, however, also show that the prot-maximizing cartel
price is non-monotone on [0; 1]. Moreover, as  goes to 1, Harrington (2004 and 2005) predict
a limit cartel price that is equal to the competitive price pN . This implies that for  close to 1,
the prot-maximizing cartel price seriously underestimates the potential maximal damage to
society (consumers) under sustainable cartel behavior. The following gure illustrates these
ndings, where the solid curve is the lower envelope of the two dotted curves that represent
the discussed price curves.
-
6
112
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1
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4 Leniency Programs
As we have shown, traditional antitrust policy alone may not be e¤ective to eradicate all
cartel prices. One revision of antitrust policy that is considered recently in most of the EU
countries and in the US is what is often referred to as a leniency program.15 The essence of
such program is that cartel members can self-report their misbehavior to the AA and that
in return self-reporting rms have to pay less severe penalties. According to the current
leniency programs in Europe, a self-reporting rm will receive a reduced ne that depends
on how many other rms have self reported already. The US can be seen as an extreme
variant of the EC system in which the rst self-reporting rm is fully exempted and all
15See OECD (2002), (EC 2002), and (D.O.J. 1993) for detailed information about structure of leniency
programs in most EU countries and in the US.
21
subsequent self-reporting rms will have to pay the full ne. In this section, we examine
antitrust policies with ex-ante leniency programs and study its impact on the maximal cartel
price. We will characterize the necessary and su¢ cient conditions under which introducing
leniency programs as part of antitrust policy is e¤ective. This implies that ex-ante leniency
programs are not by its mere presence e¤ective.
We incorporate a simplied ex-ante leniency program into the model as follows. In every
period, rms rst choose their cartel price simultaneously as before. Upon a cartel being
formed, i.e., all choose p 2  pN ; pM and cartel prots are realized, rms then independently
and simultaneously choose whether to self-report to the AA before any investigation begins.
If at least one rm self-reports, all cartel members are convicted and ned. If no rm self-
reports, the authority investigates the industry with probability  () as in Section 3. The
stage game in any period is a two-stage game, hence the repeated game model is an innitely
repeated sequential game, see e.g. Wen (2002). As in Rey (2003), we assume the hard case
of public self-reporting meaning that if someone reveals information, this cannot be kept
secret and all other cartel members immediately know this.
There are two situations that are particularly important to our later analysis. If none
of the rms self-reports, then the expected prot to a rm during a period is simply equal
to (p)    (p) k(p)(p). However, if a rm self-reports while none of the other rms self-
reports, the prot to the (only) self-reporting rm is (p)   (p)(p) in the period, where
(p)(p) is the reduced ne that the rst self-reporting rm has to pay. Assume that
(pN) = 0, (p)  k(p) and (p) is non-increasing and continuous for all p 2 (pN ; pM ] with
limp#pN  (p) = . Note that it is possible that  (p) < 0, meaning a self-reporting rm will
be rewarded. The absence of a leniency program can be treated as a special case by setting
 (p) = k(p), meaning self-reporting does not yield any reduction of the ne for cooperating
with the authorities. The US leniency program is captured by  (p) = 0 and the EC leniency
program corresponds to 0   (p)  k(p), where both  (p) and k (p) are constant and  (p)
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can be reinterpreted as a constant percentage of ne reduction.16 17
The issue of multiple self-reporting rms has been much discussed in the literature, see
e.g. Spagnolo (2007) and Motchenkova (2004), because the largest ne reduction in many
countries applies only to the rst self-reporting rm and all other rms would pay higher
nes up to the full ne. Given that the decisions to self-report are taken simultaneously, our
model cannot capture the rst self-reporting rm. Since we study the subgame perfect
equilibrium in which no rm will self-report along the equilibrium outcome path, it is not
necessary to specify the expected prots in case more than a single rm unilaterally deviates
by self-reporting. So, multiple self-reporting rms are not a concern in our analysis of the
symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in which no rm will self-report along the equilibrium
outcome path, since only unilateral decision matters.18
Since the objective of a leniency program is to provide an incentive for the individual rm
to self-report, such policy adds a second destabilizing force to the cartel. As in the previous
sections, we characterize the maximal cartel price sustainable by the following modied
grim-trigger strategy prole:
1. Firms continue to set a price p > pN with probability 1    every time after the AA
detects their fraud (and with probability  behave competitively thereafter).
2. Any deviation by one of the cartel members (either setting a lower price or self-
reporting) leads to the perfectly competitive equilibrium in every period thereafter.
As before, this modied grim-trigger strategy prole assumes that the trust is gone forever
when a cartel member either undercuts the cartel price or self-reports. Given the implicit
cartel agreement, the expected prots of sustaining the cartel price p are equal to V (p) in (3)
16The competition stage with ex-ante leniency in Motta and Polo (2003) results if we assume the constant
function  (p) =  2 0; k, where k (p) = k. Spagnolo (2004) and Rey (2003) correspond to  2   1; k :
17In our terminology, Harrington and Chen (2006) assumes  (p) (p) = k (p) (p) + F , where F > 0 is
a xed ne,  2 [0; 1] and k (p) (p) represents each rms liability of private lawsuits. Note that  = F .
18Although the percentage of ne reductions specied by the current leniency programs in the US and EU
do not depend on the severity of the o¤ense, our model allows nes and percentages of ne reductions to
vary with the severity of collusion. Our model also allows for rewarding self-reporting rms, although it has
not been implemented in practice.
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for the same reason. In this modied grim-trigger strategies, there are two types of unilateral
one-stage deviations: undercut the cartel price and self-report to the AA. Each type of such
deviation can be analyzed independently from the other. Inequality (5) is still the necessary
and su¢ cient condition under which no cartel member would undercut the cartel price.
The expected continuation prot of the one-stage deviation by self-reporting consists of
paying the reduced ne  (p)(p) in the current period followed by the continuation prots
from the competitive equilibrium pN forever after due to the breakdown of trust. Therefore,
a rm will not self-report if and only if
  (p)(p)  (p) [ k(p)(p) + (1  )V (p)] + [1  (p)] V (p);
which simplies to
1   (p)  V (p)
(p)
=
1
(p)
: (9)
Condition (9) implies that, in order to break the silence of no self-reporting, the AA should
choose a ne reduction  (p)  k (p) that is su¢ ciently low. More specically, the leniency
program fails to be e¤ective if  (p)  1, i.e., the reduced ne should never be more than the
rms prot in a single period. When  (p) < 1, which is relevant for su¢ ciently large  and
su¢ ciently low , the AA would have to compensate the self-reporting rm for voluntarily
giving up its future expected rents from staying in the cartel, i.e.,  (p) must be negative.19
Hence, from here on we only consider the case of  (p) < 1 and investigate whether the
leniency program is e¤ective. Accordingly, (9) can be rewritten as
1
1   (p)  (p): (10)
Under a leniency program, the maximal cartel price is given by
pL = max
p2[pN ;pM ]
p; s.t. (5) and (10), (11)
19Possibility and e¤ectiveness of rewards has also been extensively studied in Spagnolo (2004) or Spagnolo
(2007).
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where superscript L refers to the presence of the leniency program. In Section 3, we have
shown that (5) and p 2 [pN ; pM ] imply that p 2 [pN ; pR]. Now dene
~p  max
p2[pN ;pM ]
p; s.t. (10).
First, notice that the competitive price pN satises (10). Since (p) and  (p) are both
continuous for p 2 (pN ; pM ], (10) also induces a non-empty closed subset of [pN ; pM ]. More
specically, if (10) fails for all p 2 (pN ; pM ], i.e.,
1
1  limp#pN  (p)
< (pN);
then ~p = pN . If (10) holds at pM , then ~p = pM . Otherwise, since  () is non-increasing by
assumption and () is non-decreasing by Lemma 4, we have a unique ~p 2 (pN ; pM) such
that (10) holds with equality at ~p.
The analysis thus far implies the following result:
Proposition 9 Under antitrust regulation with a leniency program, we have
pL = minfpR; ~pg 2 [pN ; pR]:
We illustrate this result for the case pL = ~p < pR under constant  () and  () functions
by the following gure.
-
6
p1
(p)
pR
(1  ) 1
~p
(p)
Recall that (4) is equivalent to   (p). Similarly, constraint (9) is equivalent to
   (p)  [ (p) k (p)   (p)]
[1   (p)] [1   (p)] : (12)
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Note that  (pN) = 0 and  (p) is a non-decreasing and continuous function of p 2 (pN ; pM ].
The following result characterizes the maximal cartel price as a function of the discount
factor .
Proposition 10 The maximal cartel price pL is non-decreasing in  2 (0; 1) and non-
increasing in  2 (0; 1). Furthermore, we have
pL = pN ; for  2 (0;max(pN); (pN)	);
pL 2 [pN ; pM); for  2 [max(pN); (pN)	 ;max(pM); (pM)	);
pL = pM ; for  2 [max(pM); (pM)	 ; 1):
Proof. Observe that () is decreasing in  2 (0; 1) and increasing in  2 (0; 1). Increas-
ing  and/or decreasing  will relax both (4) and (10). Therefore, pL is non-decreasing in
 2 (0; 1) and non-increasing in  2 (0; 1).
For  2 (0;max(pN); (pN)	), either (4) or (10) fails for all p 2 (pN ; pM ]. Therefore,
we have pL = pN . For  2 [max(pM); (pM)	 ; 1), both (4) and (10) hold at pM , and hence
pM is the maximal cartel price. Otherwise, for  2 [max(pN); (pN)	 ;max(pM); (pM)	),
it must be the case that pL 2 [pN ; pM).
Combining Proposition 7 and 9, we obtain
pN = pL = pR = pN ; for  2 (0;min(pN); (pN)	);
pN = pL  pR < pM ; for  2 [min(pN); (pN)	 ;max(pN); (pN)	];
pN < pL < pR < pM ; for  2 (min(pN); (pN)	 ;min(pM); (pM)	);
pN < pL < pR = pM ; for  2 (min(pM); (pM)	 ;max(pN); (pN)	);
pM = pL = pR = pM ; for  2 [max(pN); (pN)	 ; 1):
The policy relevant question is then whether such a leniency program is e¤ective to upset
the cartel price p 2  pN ; pM. Suppose that without the leniency program, it is possible to
sustain a cartel price p 2  pN ; pR meaning (p)  (p) holds. The leniency program is
e¤ective to upset the cartel price p if and only if (10) fails at p. Accordingly,
1
1  (p) < (p)  (p)()  (p) < 1 
1
(p)
 1  1
(p)
 0: (13)
Before discussing (13), we rst state the following result.
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Lemma 11 The upper bound 1   1
(p)
is non-decreasing in p and increasing in p if either
0(p) > 0 or k0(p) > 0. Moreover, 1  1
(p)
is increasing in , k (p) and  (p) and decreasing
in .
Proof. All results follow immediately from Lemma 4 after observing that 1  1

responds
similar to changes in variables and parameters as .
The upper bound (13) on  (p) has several interesting and important implications. First,
it implies that in order for the ex-ante leniency program to be e¤ective, the rst self-reporting
rm needs to be rewarded as  (p) < 0. This result is quite intuitive. Since a rms future
expected cartel prot is positive (i.e. higher than the competitive prots), in order to induce
a rm to self-report, this rm will have to be compensated for foregoing its positive future
expected prot. Since the current leniency programs in the OECD countries all feature
 ()  0 , the inevitable conclusion is that the ex-ante part of these programs is ine¤ective.
Second, (13) provides an upper bound on  (p) that depends only upon  (p) and not on
 (p). Therefore, this bound is indirectly related to the current antitrust regulation and some
specic industry characteristics, like  and , but is independent of the industry characteristic
 (p), which may be the most di¢ cult to estimate from empirical data.
Third, by the monotonicity of Lemma 11, it is easy to design an e¤ective constant ex-ante
leniency program such that (13) holds for all p 2  pN ; pR:
 (p) = 1  1
(pN)
= inf
p2(pN ;pR]
[1  1
(p)
]  1  1
(p)
:
Although constant leniency program can be easily implemented in guidelines, it has the
drawback of o¤ering too much rewards for all p > pN .
Fourth, legal and economic principles often di¤er and this is also the case for leniency
programs. Since e¤ective programs require rewards, this obviously violates the "crime should
not pay" principle. Lemma 11, however, o¤ers some scope for implementing reward schemes
that reward less the more severe violations. This indicates a limited degree of moral or
juridical reasons that can be allowed in e¤ective ex-ante leniency programs. This result holds
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independently of the industry characteristics  (p), cartel culture , the discount factor ,
and for any antitrust regulation as specied in Section 3.
Another economic principle is to keep the e¤ective reward () as low as possible. Denote
the minimal e¤ective reward as ^ (p), then after substituting (5) into (13), we obtain
(p) < ^ (p) =
 (p) k (p)   [1   (p)]
1   [1   (p)] : (14)
By denition, the minimal e¤ective reward ^ (p) has the properties stated in Lemma 11. The
fact that cartels that set higher prices arouse more suspicions makes them more vulnerable
to be uncovered. This implies a positive e¤ect on the expected penalty and a negative e¤ect
on the expected time of enjoying the benets from the cartel before the rst conviction.
Lower expected net benets makes coming forward more attractive and, since the minimal
e¤ective reward is non-decreasing, requires a lower minimal e¤ective reward. So, the presence
of suspicions has a dampening e¤ect on the minimal e¤ective reward. Consequently, cartels
that set low prices and by doing so arouse less suspicions are the most costly to terminate
through leniency.
We now summarize our main ndings in the following proposition:
Proposition 12 There always exists an e¤ective ex-ante leniency program  (p) that satis-
es (13) for all p 2 (pN ; pR]. This program eradicates all cartel prices in (pN ; pR], it requires
rewards, i.e.,  (p) < 0, and allows for a non-decreasing minimal reward leniency program
^ (p).
Below we provide several remarks with respect to policy intervention and explain the
main policy implications that follow from our results. First, it is important to realize that
the minimal e¤ective reward ^ () critically depends upon the existing traditional antitrust
policy. So, changing the latter always has repercussions on the minimal reward ex-ante
e¤ective leniency program. Therefore, future reforms of the antitrust policy should consider
simultaneously the traditional antitrust policy and the ex-ante leniency program. Second,
the minimal e¤ective reward has to be tailor-made to each industry or economic sector.
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Therefore, an one-size-ts-all ex-ante leniency program that by denition cannot incorporate
industry characteristics and sector-dependent antitrust regulation inevitably either fails the
minimal reward property in (14), or fails to be e¤ective for some sectors and some cartel
prices. In particular, constant ex-ante leniency programs for all sectors will involve too much
rewarding rms at some cartel prices for some sectors and, where it remains ine¤ective, will
o¤er too little incentives to come forward in other sectors. Third, since cartels that set low
prices arouse little suspicions these cartels are the most costly to upset through tailor-made
minimal-reward leniency programs. Such cartels, however, are also the cartels that cause the
least damage to society. The trade-o¤ between eliminating low-price cartels and the high
costs through minimal rewards lies outside the scope of the current paper, but is certainly
relevant for practice.
Our result that ex-ante leniency programs are ine¤ective generalizes the ndings reported
in Motta and Polo (2003), Spagnolo (2004) and Rey (2003) for very specic settings. In the
last reference, it is also shown that the minimal e¤ective reward is unbounded if  goes to
1. Taking this limit for ^ (:) evaluated at arbitrary p in (pN ; pM ] shows that this limit is
bounded for all  > 0 and that it is only unbounded for the boundary case  = 0, which
is the case analyzed in Rey (2003). Our results also hint at that the ine¤ectiveness of ex-
ante leniency programs without rewards reported in Harrington and Chen (2006) for the
prot-maximizing cartel price under very large discount factors generalizes to a wider class
of di¤erent objective functions for the cartel and all discount factors.
We now conclude this section by revisiting our example of the homogenous Bertrand
oligopoly, which is also studied in Harrington and Chen (2006).
Example 13 Reconsider Example 8. Under antitrust regulation  (p) = p and k (p) = k,
where 0 < k < 1, we rst note that  (p) satises (13) for all p 2 (pN ; pM ] if and only if
 (p) < ^(p)  kp   (1  p)
1   (1  p) :
Since 0 (p) =  > 0, this function is strictly increasing in p. The following gure plots
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several minimal reward leniency programs ^(p) for  = 0:2, k = 3,  = 0:5 and  = 0:7,
 = 0:8 and  = 0:9. The higher , the larger the size of the minimal e¤ective reward (in
absolute value) needs to be.
-
?
p
1
 5
 10
^(p)
 = :7
 = :8
 = :9
This gure illustrates that ^(p) is increasing in p, as asserted. When the actual leniency
program (p) is non-increasing in p,  (p) and ^(p) intersect at most once at ~p 2 (pN ; pM ]
(in this last gure, which is equivalent to (1   (p)) 1 intersects  (p) at most once at ~p).
As the curve (p) shifts downwards, i.e., the reward for all p 2 (pN ; pM ] increases, pL may
decrease since the intersection point ~p either moves to the left or stays the same. Finally, the
following gure illustrates how the constant leniency program  (p) =  4 a¤ects the maximal
cartel price under the benchmark, antitrust policy and e¤ective leniency for the parameter
values  = 0:2, k = 3,  = 0:5 above and n = 4.
-
6
134
1
pL
The vertical dotted line at  = n 1
n
= :75 illustrates the discontinuous jump in the cartel
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price for the benchmark case (Example 2) and the dotted curve depicts the cartel price under
antitrust regulation (Example 8). Note that pR = 1 at  = 1 belongs to both possible cases
illustrated in Example 8. The solid curve corresponds to pL. It eradicates all cartel prices
for :75    :8 and reduces the maximal cartel price pL = ~p < pR for  > 0:8. Note that we
cannot support pL = 1 because by (12) it would require    (1) > 1.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we explore a general innitely-repeated game framework for the analysis of
antitrust violations in the presence of both traditional antitrust policies and ex-ante leniency
programs. This framework allows for the simultaneous analysis of two important decisions
cartel members face in the presence of leniency programs: decisions to deviate from the cartel
price and decisions to self-report to the authorities. A novel concept is the maximal cartel
price that reects societys worst cartel price among those cartel prices that are sustainable,
which endogenizes the cartel formation decision and its pricing strategy. The generality
of our framework is also reected in allowing for endogenous detection probabilities and
penalty schemes that are each non-decreasing in the cartel price.20 As a consequence, the
expected punishment is also endogenous. Our framework allows to integrate decisions about
self-reporting, cartel formation and its pricing strategy (maximal cartel price) and relate
these to the type and structure of the industry including its cartel culture parameter.
Our analysis makes several contributions to the literature: A general technique to char-
acterize and also to separate the e¤ects of traditional antitrust enforcement and ex-ante
leniency programs on the maximal cartel price. We also clarify that an important impli-
cation of the one-stage-deviation principle is that one can restrict any equilibrium analysis
to either price deviations or deviations considering self-reporting, but it is unnecessary to
consider both simultaneously.
20Endogenous detection probabilities o¤er a better description of real life situations and, therefore, are
conceptually better suited for the analysis of antitrust violations. Instead, most of the literature on leniency
assumes a xed exogenous detection probability, which avoids the technical di¢ culties tackled in our paper.
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In this framework, we identify the su¢ cient and necessary conditions for which antitrust
regulation is e¤ective in reducing the maximal cartel price. We conclude that an antitrust
policy is less e¤ective in sectors where the degree of cartel stability is higher or where the
sectors cartel culture to continue business as usual is more prominent. Confronting our
theoretical results with stylized facts from currently employed antitrust policies in OECD
countries imply that these policies are ine¤ective.
An e¤ective ex-ante leniency program that eradicates all cartel prices always exists.
Such leniency program, however, necessarily involves rewards. Furthermore, many reward
schemes, including constant schemes, imply either too much or too little rewarding at some
cartel prices. Since current leniency programs apply uniformly over all sectors, over/under
rewarding will also di¤er across sectors. This implies that sector-specic minimal e¤ective
reward schemes would be the best solution in terms of o¤ering precisely the amount of money
to induce self-reporting.
The main results also have several policy implications. First, e¤ectiveness of antitrust
regulation and ex-ante leniency programs depends upon industry characteristics, such as
industry or product life-cycle, sectors cartel culture, or the type of competition. Second, a
minimal-reward leniency program has to be tailor made to each industry or economic sector
instead of an one-size-ts-all leniency program. The reason is that an one-size-ts-all program
may involve too much rewarding rms at some cartel prices in some economic sectors and may
o¤er too little incentives to come forward in other sectors. Third, according to Rey (2003),
AAs often do not observe relevant information in the absence of an audit. The presence
of suspicions could be a reason for the authorities to develop antennas for picking up such
signals and develop lters to sift false rumors from true ones prior to an investigation. We do
not investigate the costs and benets of developing such policy instrument, but our analysis
shows that if the authorities can transform suspicions into an e¤ective policy instrument it
will have a dampening e¤ect on the maximal cartel price.
Our analysis also reveals that the prot-maximizing cartel price in Harrington (2004 and
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2005) may underestimate the maximal damage to society whenever the equilibrium con-
ditions are nonbinding. As motivated in the introduction, economic agents often behave
di¤erently from standard microeconomic theory and the criterion of sustainability of car-
tel behavior o¤ers an alternative and more robust framework that does not depend on the
precise assumptions about cartel behavior. In this perspective, the maximal cartel price
characterizes societys maximal damage and can therefore be regarded as a worst-case sce-
nario.
The US Department of Justice (D.O.J.) reports empirical evidence in favor of the major
modications of its leniency program in 1993, see D.O.J. (1998).21 Despite this empirical
evidence, Spagnolo (2007) asserts that leniency programs are still not fully understood theo-
retically. In particular, he raises the issue whether the observed increases in cartel detection
are the result of unobserved increases in cartel activity (under equal detection probabilities)
or are the result of improved e¤ectiveness of leniency programs. Based on our results we are
also able to address the last issue. Under a xed traditional antitrust policy, introducing
an ex-ante leniency program does not increase (unobserved) cartel activity. The ex-ante
leniency programs in the US and the EC, however, are ine¤ective. Only su¢ ciently large
rewards can increase cartel detection through revelation by the cartel. This is a general and
robust result that goes far beyond the special cases studied in Spagnolo (2004), Rey (2003)
and Harrington and Chen (2006).
An important goal set by theoretical articles, see e.g. the survey in Spagnolo (2007), is
the determination of the optimal design of the antitrust policy and the leniency program.
Studying the optimal design requires a well-dened framework for analyzing the e¤ects of
changes in the antitrust policy and the leniency program on societys welfare. Such changes
can be thought of as shaping the functions describing the antitrust policy and the leniency
program and, ideally, one would like a exible and large class of such policy functions that
21Three major modications were implemented: Amnesty is automatic if there is no pre-existing investi-
gation; even if an investigation is under way, amnesty may still be available provided substantial evidence is
brought forward; and all o¢ cers, directors, and employees who collaborate with the AA are protected from
criminal prosecution.
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are a priori neither constant or linear. Although our analysis did not address optimal de-
sign directly, our framework allows for such a rich class of potential policy functions and
a characterization of the maximal cartel price. Taking the latter price as a proxy for soci-
etys maximal damage, one can easily extend our framework by specifying social welfare as
a function of the maximal cartel price and including societys costs of implementing certain
policy functions. So, potentially, our framework could enhance the analysis of the optimal
design of antitrust policies and leniency programs.
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